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The foreign debts of the European countries are at the core of the current crises. Generally, 
the crises are attributed to government budget deficits in excess of the values stated in the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)/Maastricht treaty. Proposals for reform generally involve 
increasing the powers of the European Union to monitor fiscal policies of the national 
governments and increasing bank regulation. My article is concerned with the following 
issues. [Q1] How can one explain the inter country differences in the debt crisis in Europe? Is 
there a single explanation, cause? [Q2] Specifically, were the crises due to government budget 
deficits or to the private sector? The answer will determine what is the appropriate policy to 
prevent a recurrence. [Q3] The Stability and Growth Pact/Maastricht Treaty and the European 
Union focused upon rules concerning government debt ratios and deficit ratios. They ignored 
the problem of “excessive” debt ratios in the private sector that led to a crisis in the financial 
markets. Neither the markets nor the Central Banks anticipated the crises until it was too late. 
My basic questions are: What is an “excessive” private sector debt ratio that is likely to lead 
to a crisis? What are theoretically based, not empirical ad hoc, Early Warning Signals (EWS) 
of debt crises? The answers determine to a large extent how one should evaluate proposals for 
economic reform, to avert future crises? 
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Basic Statistics related to the Origins of the Crises.  
Table 1 presents the Government Structural Balance as a percentage of potential 
GDP. It refers to the general government cyclically adjusted balance adjusted for 
nonstructural elements beyond the economic cycle. Table 2 presents the Government Net 
Debt as a percent of GDP. Both are derived from EconStats, IMF, World Economic 
Outlook.  
Table 1. Government Structural Balance % GDP (SBGDP) 
  Euro  Spain  Ireland  Portugal   Greece 
1998  -2.03  -1.736  1.219  -3.4  -2.86 
1999  -1.6  -1.02  0.269  -3.38  -1.89 
2000  -1.969  -1.22  1.673  -4.7  -2.68 
2001  -2.676  -1.757  -1.8  -5.5  -3.647 
2002  -2.86  -1.1  -2.757  -4.9  -4.1 
2003  -3.1  -0.976  -3.167  -4.89  -6.03 
2004  -2.98  -0.978  -2.75  -5.2  -8.638 
2005  -2.67  -1.598  -3.756  -5.7  -6.01 
2006  -2.07  -1.275  -4.0  -3.9  -4.9 
2007  -1.83  -1.132  -7.3  -3.4  -6.795 
2008  -2.58  -4.9  -11.26  -4.02  -11.47 
1998-2007, 
Mean  (st. 
dev.)  
-2.38 (0.54)  -1.28 (0.31)  -2.24 (2.71)  -4.5 (0.09)  -4.76 (2.11) 
Sources: Tables 1,2. EconStats, IMF World Economic Outlook 
Table 1 shows that the General government structural balances as a percent of 
potential GDP (SBGDP) in Greece and Portugal are different from Ireland and Spain. 
The last row contains the mean and standard deviation in the pre crisis period 1998 - 
2007. In Greece and Portugal the SBGDP have been on average twice as high as in the 
Euro area, whereas in Spain the SBGDP have been significantly lower and in Ireland they 
have been similar to the Euro area.  Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  3 
Table 2 presents the ratio of Government debt as a percentage of GDP. When the 
crisis in the private banking sector occurred in some countries particularly Ireland and 
Spain, the government bailed out the banks by purchasing private debt in exchange for 
public debt. The government/taxpayers then became the debtor to foreign investors. The 
effect of the government bailout of the private banking sector is seen in row labeled 
2009/2007. It is the government net debt ratio in the post crisis year 2009 relative to its 
level in the pre crisis year 2007. The difference relates both to the bailout and to the loss 
of tax revenues from the recession.  
Table 2 shows that the government debt ratio and hence debt burden – interest 
payments/GDP –was rising in Greece and Portugal from 1998 to 2007 before the crisis. 
The ratio of debt burden in the row 2007/1998 was Portugal 1.42, Greece 1.16, Spain 
0.53 and Ireland 0.43. One infers  from these two tables that the trend in fiscal 
policy/government budgetary policy – where structural deficits led to debt burdens - was 
primarily at the origin of the crises in Greece and Portugal, whereas the origin of the 
crisis in Ireland and Spain (explained below) was primarily the private banking sector 
and subsequent government bailout. The crucial questions answered below are what are 
the origins of these public and private debts and what are “excessive” debts?   Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  4 
 
Table 2. Government net Debt % GDP.  
  Spain  Ireland  Portugal  Greece 
1998  57.37  53.22  42.96  71.73 
1999  54.48  47.8  42.01  75.85 
2000  50.27  36.67  41.97  77.41 
2001  47.54  27.3  46.39  81.15 
2002  44  25.13  48.12  84.47 
2003  41.3  22.7  51.22  81.93 
2004  38.58  19.94  53.28  82.88 
2005  34.71  15.92  57.95  84.07 
2006  30.53  12.16  58.77  81.66 
2007  26.52  12.18  58.1  80.35 
2008  30.36  23.04  61.13  83.4 











2009/2007  1.65  2.99  1.24  1.21 
2007/1998  0.53  0.43  1.42  1.16 
   
Role of the private sector in the crises in Ireland and Spain  
In Ireland and Spain the structural budget deficits were lower than in the Euro 
area (table 1). In these countries, the private sector – housing and banks - was the origin 
of the debt crisis. First, I describe what happened in these countries. Second I explain the 
economics underlying the bubble/crash, which leads into an analysis of Early Warning 
Signals.  Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  5 
 
Ireland 
I draw upon The Irish Banking Crisis (2010). The Celtic Tiger boom in the late 
1980s brought sustained growth in employment, income and household formation. 
Ireland’s becoming a founding member of the Euro zone brought a sustained fall in 
nominal interest rates, which in turn led to higher asset valuations. The growing 
construction boom was financed by Irish banks which in turn were financed by external 
financial markets where inexpensive funds were available. In the last four years of the 
boom from 2003 onwards banks competed aggressively in the mortgage markets with 
little regard for the creditworthiness of the mortgagors. At the end of 2003, net 
indebtedness of Irish banks to the world was over 10% GDP. By 2008, borrowing mainly 
for property jumped to over 60% GDP. 
Even before the failure of Lehman Brothers (Sept. 2008) Irish residential 
properties had been falling for more than eighteen months. At no point throughout the 
period – even as the crisis neared - did the Central bank and Financial Services Authority 
of Ireland staff believe that any of the institutions were facing serious underlying 
difficulties let alone insolvency problems. 
When the crisis occurred, the collapse of construction and the fall in property 
prices led to the insolvency of banks. Their net worth vanished. The state took large 
equity stakes in most banks and issued government guaranteed bonds. Although Ireland’s 
public debt immediately prior to the crisis was low, the fiscal deficit and public sector 
borrowing surged. See table 2 row labeled 2009/2007. The primary reason for the surge 
in the deficit was the collapse of tax revenues in 2008-09 due to the collapse of the 
housing sector.  
Spain 
I draw upon Banco de Espana report (2008). Throughout the 1989-2006 period, 
demand in the Spanish economy grew at 4.7% pa whereas output expanded by 3.8% pa, 
driven by immigration and increased labor force participation. There was scarcely any Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  6 
growth in productivity. Since absorption exceeded production, external debt grew and the 
real exchange rate – equal to the nominal rate times relative prices - appreciated. Insofar 
as the nominal exchange rate was fixed in the Euro area, Spanish prices and costs rose 
relative to the rest of the Euro area. The Spanish economy lost competitiveness. 
Unlike previous expansions, the resort to financing was not chiefly by the public 
sector which reduced its debt throughout the period. See table 2. Instead it was the 
Spanish households and firms that swiftly increased their debts. The real estate market 
propelled the expansion. Housing prices climbed from an average rate of 1% pa between 
1995- 97 to 18% pa between 2003-04, or an annual average increase between 1995-2007 
of 10%.  
What facilitated the growth in the debt was the availability of cheap credit in the 
international financial markets. As a result, the Spanish economy, which needed virtually 
no foreign funding in 1996, became a borrower. In 2008 total net borrowing from the rest 
of the world was 9.1 % GDP. 
When housing prices fell, the banks – which financed the housing sector - were 
unable to repay their loans to the international lenders. Governments responded forcefully 
to the intensification of the financial crisis. At first, measures had focused on the selective 
bail-out of ailing systemic banks, supplementing the actions of central banks to prevent 
liquidity problems in the banking sector from becoming insolvency problems. However, 
the risks of financial collapse and the increasingly evident and heightened prospect of 
global recession led to the widespread approval of plans to support the financial sector 
and to boost aggregate demand via fiscal stimulus. The breadth of the measures adopted 
and the volume of resources mobilized were on an unprecedented scale. The effect of the 
crisis raised the ratio of government debt 2009/2007 in table 2 to 1.65. Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  7 
 
 
Quantitative summary of the role of the private sector in the European Crises: 
Growth, Housing price appreciation/capital gains and low interest rates 
In Ireland and Spain, unlike Greece and Portugal, the private sector – housing and 
banks - was the origin of the debt crisis. Table 3 and figure 1 provide a quantitative 
summary of this phenomenon among countries. 
The low world rates of interest and high domestic growth led to a rise in housing 
prices. In the period 1991-2000 the growth rates in Ireland and Spain were very high, and 
generated a boom in housing prices. 
Table 3 indicates the large capital gains resulting from investment in housing in 
Ireland and Spain, relative to the Euro area. The mean capital gain was Ireland 13.2%, 
Spain 9.71% and the Euro area 5.16%. Irish and Spanish banks borrowed abroad at low 
rates of interest (see figure 1) and loaned these funds to the housing industry. The 
anticipated return was the marginal product of capital plus the anticipated capital gain. 
Investors within and without the Euro area ignored the default risk and creditors in the 
Euro area did not have to consider an exchange rate risk. Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  8 
Table 3. Residential property prices EU countries, annual % change, new and 
existing houses.  
  Germany  Ireland  Greece  Portugal  Spain  Italy  France   Euro 
area 
1996  -1.1  -  9.9  1.7  1.4  2.4  -  2.0 
1997  -1.9  -  8.2  3.6  2.8  3.4  0.1  2.3 
1998  -1.6  22.6  14.4  4.5  5.8  -1.4  1.9  2.5 
1999  1.4  22.5  8.9  9  7.7  0.8  7.1  4.9 
2000  0.2  20.5  10.6  7.7  8.6  3.9  8.8  6 
2001  0.2  14.0  14.4  5.4  9.9  6.0  1.9  5.5 
2002  -1.9  6.1  13.9  0.6  15.7  12.6  8.3  6.8 
2003  -1.2  14.3  5.4  1.1  17.6  7.2  11.7  6.4 
2004  -1.4  11.5  2.3  0.6  17.4  7.0  15.2  7.2 
2005  -1.5  7.2  10.9  2.3  13.4  8.6  15.3  7.6 
2006  0.3  13.4  12.2  2.1  10.4  5.8  12.1  6.4 
2007  0.3  0.9  -  1.3  5.8  5.0  6.1  4.3 
Mean  -0.68  13.3  10.1  3.3  9.71  5.11  8.05  5.16 




Source: BIS Housing Statistics IFC Bulletin #31 annex 1. 
Role of the Capital Market 
The capital market assumed that, since these countries are in the Euro 
area/common currency, there is neither an exchange rate risk nor a default risk. The 
capital market treated these countries alike insofar as interest rates were concerned, and 
did not charge countries a risk premium relative to the rest of the Euro area during the 
period 2000 - 2008. Figure 1 graphs, for Ireland, Greece and Portugal, interest rate 
spreads relative to the German Bund (Plagnol, 2010/Reuters). From the time of the Greek 
entry in 2000 until 2008 when there was the Lehman Brothers failure, the spread was 
negligible. Hence no debt problem was anticipated for these three countries. Effectively, Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  9 
there was a large supply of international funds at low interest rates to finance the gap 
between investment and social saving – resulting from the structural government budget 
deficit –in Greece and Portugal (figure 1).  
The Credit default Swap (CDS) rate is the premium paid for insurance against 
default. (A CDS rate of y basis points bp means that it costs $1000y to insure $10 million 
of debt for five years). The CDS rates for Ireland and Greece indicated little doubt about 
default until 2009. The rates for both were below 100 bp until the beginning of 2009. The 
CDS rate for Ireland ranged between 100 and 150 bp whereas for Greece the rate rose to 
400 bp.  
The situation only changed when Lehman Brothers failed. Then the CDS rates 
and interest rates on Greek and Irish securities rose. The conclusion is that the market for 
bonds denominated in Euros did not reflect doubts about default until quite late in the 
crisis. There were not Early Warning Signals that were used by the markets. The 
precipitating factor in the recognition of default risk in Europe was the failure of Lehman 
Brothers. By then it was too late. 
The ignoring of default risk stands in contrast with the U.S. experience where, 
despite having a common currency, the market evaluates municipalities according to the 
default risk. Neither the Treasury nor the Federal Reserve intervenes in the fiscal policies 
of the municipalities nor contemplates bailouts when they are experiencing difficulties in 
servicing their debts. Table 4 presents the distribution of ratings, and hence interest rates 
that the capital market charges the various U.S. municipalities. Unlike Europe the 
discipline comes from the markets and not from the government. 
 
 Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  10 
 
Figure 1 Interest rate spreads versus the Bund 
 
Table 4. United States Municipal Rating Distribution 1970-2000 
AAA  3.15% 
Aa  11.5 
A  54.42 
Baa  29.9 
Ba  0.8 
B  0.13 
Caa-C  0.02 
Special Comment. Moody’s US Municipal Bond Rating Scale, Nov. 2002 
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Evaluation of the Excess debt, actual less optimum, of the private sector 
Neither the markets nor the Central Banks anticipated the crises until it was too 
late. The basic question is: What is an “excessive” private sector debt ratio that is likely 
to lead to a crisis? The collapse of the housing market led to bank failures that led to 
bailouts. I now explain theoretically based, not empirical ad hoc, Early Warning Signals 
(EWS) of debt crises. The crucial variable is leverage or the debt/net worth ratio. 
Leverage = assets/net worth = 1 + debt/net worth. 
Net worth is assets less debt. The growth of net worth is affected by leverage. An 
increase in debt to finance the purchase of assets increases the growth of net worth by the 
return on investment, but decreases the growth of net worth by the associated interest 
payments. The return on investment has two components. The first is the productivity of 
assets and the second is the capital gain on the assets. An increase in leverage will 
increase expected growth of net worth if the return on investment exceeds the interest 
rate. The productivity of assets is observed, but the future capital gain and the interest 
rates are unknown when the investment decision is made.  
The basic equation for the growth of net worth is crucial to understanding the 
excesses of the private sector and evaluation of desirable policy. A rise in the ratio of 
debt/net worth, say by banks, is used to purchase assets, say investments in housing. The 
increase in debt raises the growth of net worth if the anticipated capital gain on the assets 
plus the rate of return on the assets exceed the interest rate.  
Growth of net worth = (debt ratio)[capital gain + return on assets – interest rate] 
The capital gains are described in Table 3 and the interest rates in figure 1. The 
huge capital gains in housing for Spain and Ireland, and low interest rates, during the 
period 2002-2006 led to a rise in the debt ratio of the private sector. That is, the term in 
brackets was large so the private housing sector increased its debt directly to banks and 
indirectly to  foreign investors. The investment in housing seemed to be profitable 
because the debt could be refinanced/repaid from the recent capital gains – not from the 
marginal product of capital. But these capital gains – housing price appreciation in table 3 Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  12 
- were not sustainable. The reason is that insofar as the capital gain exceeds the 
appropriate interest rate, the present vale of the asset diverges to infinity. 
The risk is that with the higher debt ratios, there would be a period when the 
capital gains fell below the interest rate – such as occurred in 2007 in Spain and Ireland. 
In fact the capital gain term and interest rate term are negatively correlated. When the 
growth of housing prices declined then the banks tried to deleverage and interest rates 
rose. Then the large negative term in brackets is multiplied by a large debt ratio and the 
net worth of the housing industry vanishes. The housing sector defaults on their loans. 
Bank failures followed the collapse of the housing market. The government then 
intervened to avert bank failures and purchased their bad debts in exchange for 
government debt. In Ireland and Spain, the debt crisis was due to the private sector and 
not to the government cyclically adjusted budget deficits. 
Early Warning Signals of an Excessive Private debt ratio likely to lead to a debt crisis 
The optimum debt ratio of the private sector, such as the housing sector, should 
maximize the expected logarithm of net worth at a terminal time. This is a risk averse 
strategy because losses are more heavily weighted than are gains. The future capital gains 
and interest rates are unknown when the debt is incurred. This is a problem of stochastic 
optimal control SOC discussed in Stein (2006)(2010)(2011). It is reasonable to assume 
that the capital gains consists of a trend/drift plus a stochastic (probabilistic) term, and the 
interest rate also has a trend/drift plus a stochastic (probabilistic) term, and that these two 
stochastic variables are negatively correlated.  
On the basis of the SOC analysis, the optimal ratio of debt/net worth (in the box 
below) has the following form. It is equal to the trend of the capital gain less the trend of 
the interest rate plus the current return on assets less a risk premium, all of that multiplied 
by risk factors consisting of variances of the capital gains, interest rates and the 
correlation between these stochastic terms. It is not the current or recent capital gains 
and interest rates that are relevant but their trends/drifts over a longer period. The 
leverage, assets/net worth, is one plus the debt ratio.  Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  13 
 
Optimal debt/net worth = [drift capital gain – drift interest rate + current return on assets 
– risk premium](Risk factors). 
Early Warning signal = excess debt = actual less optimal debt ratio. 
Two important implications of the SOC analysis are as follows. (1) The expected 
growth of net worth is maximal when the optimal debt ratio – stated in the box - is 
selected. (2) As the actual debt ratio rises above the optimum, the expected growth 
declines and the risk rises. (3) The excess debt is an early warning signal of a crisis in the 
sector, such as housing/morgtages. 
The housing sectors in Ireland and Spain selected debt ratios/leverage based upon 
recent capital gains 2003-2006. These rates far exceeded the interest rate and were 
unsustainable. They implied present values of assets that diverged to infinity. The correct 
approach would have been to use the drifts of the capital gains and interest rates, adjusted 
for risk. 
This type of Warning Signal is clearly seen in the US mortgage crisis. Figure 2 
plots a unit free measure of the actual debt ratio DEBTRATIO and a unit free measure of 
the optimal ratio RENTPRICE.  In the US the drifts/trend of the capital gains and interest 
rate were approximately equal. RENTPRICE reflects the current return on assets. The 
variables are normalized/unit free, they are deviations from their long term means divided 
by the standard deviation The details of the calculation are in Stein (2010)(2011). 
An excessive debt of the households is seen (figure 2) when the normalized debt 
ratio rises relative to the normalized value of the current return on assets, marginal 
product of capital. From 2002 to 2006, the return on assets declined more than one 
standard deviation below its long term mean while the debt ratio rose two standard 
deviations above its long term mean. This excessive debt, DEBTRATIO – RENTPRICE, 
signaled a situation where the debt can only be serviced from unsustainable capital gains.  Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  14 
 
 
Figure 2. United States. RENTPRICE, normalized rental income/index of housing 
prices, reflects the marginal product of capital. DEBTRATIO is the normalized 
household debt/disposable income. A normalized variable is (Variable – mean)/standard 
deviation. Each curve is measured in standard deviations from its own mean. Excessive 
debt is DEBTRATIO – RENTPRICE, the difference between the two curves. This is an 
early warning signal of a crisis.  
 
The situations in Ireland and Spain 2003-2006, seen particularly in Table 3, led to 
an excess debt – because the housing sector and the banks assumed that the recent capital 
gains – far above their trends – were sustainable. This was similar to the S&L crisis in the 
US in the 1980s and mortgage crises of 2007. The excess debt is an early warning signal 
of a crisis. In these countries, the decline in net worth, bankruptcy of the housing sector, 
led to the insolvency of the banking sector and then led to the bailout. The rise in 
government debt was simply an exchange of government debt for private debt.  Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  15 
 
Fiscal deficit and public debt 
Unlike Ireland and Spain, the debt crises in Greece and Portugal were due to the 
government sector. Tables 1 and 2 showed these differences. The SGP rule had no value 
in predicting the Irish and Spanish crises, but clearly deficits and debt ratios are relevant 
in the cases of Greece and Portugal. It is instructive to consider specifically the case of 
Greece, though Portuguese case was similar.  
Greece 
Greece’s large fiscal deficit and huge public debt are the cumulative result of 
chronic macroeconomic imbalances, and are at the origin of the debt crisis. I draw upon 
Annual Report of Bank of Greece. The global crisis simply aggravated Greece’s fiscal 
performance and prospects, which had already begun to deteriorate in the second half of 
2007 for reasons unassociated with the economic downturn. Indeed, the fiscal deficit has 
been above 3% of GDP almost every year for the past decade. According to revised data 
released by Eurostat on 22 April 2010, the deficit came to 5.1% in 2007, 7.7% in 2008 
and 13.6% in 2009.  
These adverse budgetary developments triggered the downgrading of Greece’s 
credit rating and a sharp widening in the yield spread of Greek government bonds vis-à-
vis German ones in late 2009 through to mid-April 2010 (fig. 1). The high public debt at 
115.1% of GDP in 2009 was the highest in the euro area along with that of Italy, and is 
expected to keep rising at least through 2014, according to certain projections.  
According to Bank of Greece staff projections, the debt dynamics is 
unfavorable, as it is estimated that the fiscal adjustment envisaged will only lead to a 
stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2014, at very high levels (over 130%), on the 
basis of conservative assumptions regarding nominal GDP growth over the next few 
years and the nominal interest rate on public debt. It is estimated that reducing the debt 
ratio to below 100% of GDP will require a systematic fiscal effort over a number of 
years, at a time when it is essential to restart the growth process and ensure that strong 
economic performance is restored within a reasonable time frame. A social security Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  16 
reform capable of successfully meeting future challenges, the strict implementation of the 
fiscal consolidation plan and the promotion of structural reforms and growth-enhancing 
initiatives constitute the only option. 
 
General Principle evaluating the government debt ratio 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)/Maastricht Treaty 
The appropriate policies, to prevent a recurrence and/or to remedy the crisis, 
depend upon the origin of the “excessive debt”. It seemed to the EU that adherence to the 
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)/Maastricht Treaty would prevent debt 
crises. This hope was belied by recent events. Proposals for reform are still focused upon 
these rules limiting government budget deficits. The SGP rules are not based upon 
economic analysis but are arbitrary. They come from an identity linking the growth rate 
of the economy, the budget deficit/GDP and the debt/GDP. This identity will be satisfied 
if the debt ratio, budget deficit/GDP, stabilizes at any arbitrary constant level. 
  Budget deficit/GDP = (Growth rate)(Debt/GDP). 
Given an arbitrary growth rate, this identity only determines the ratio (budget 
deficit)/debt. If the growth rate is 5% pa, and the deficit is constant at 3% pa then the debt 
ratio would be constant at 60%. If the deficit is constant at 6% then the debt ratio will be 
120%. The EU and IMF still use the 60% debt ratio as a target for policy. These values 
have nothing to do with whether the debt is optimal or “excessive” and are irrelevant as 
early warning signals of a crisis such as Europe has experienced.  
It is not possible to establish an optimal debt ratio – and hence excess debt ratio - 
for the government, as it was for the private sector. However, the focus should be on the 
trend of debt burden, defined as interest payments on the debt/GDP. Budget deficits 
should be viewed in terms of their effects upon the GDP. Will the borrowing/increase in 
debt raise the productivity of the economy by more than the interest rate? If the marginal 
productivity exceeds the interest rate, the debt burden – interest payments/GDP – will 
decline. For example, in the CEEC countries tax rates can be lowered which increase the 
government debt. However, the decline in tax rates may lead to FDI which increases the Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  17 
productivity of the economy. Similarly, the government may increase expenditures for 
education, health and infrastructure, which raise productivity. Alternatively, the 
government expenditures/tax reductions may simply stimulate consumption. For 
example, low rent housing, subsidies, wage increases will not raise the GDP. Since the 
interest payments exceed the marginal productivity of expenditure, the debt burden rises. 
Therefore the focus should be upon the trend of the government debt. Table 2  last row 
shows that the ratio of government debt/GDP from 1998 to 2007 was: Portugal 1.42, 
Greece 1.16 whereas in Spain it was 0.53 and in Ireland it was 0.43. This is a clear 
example of the origin of crises should be viewed. 
Repercussions in financial markets 
It is difficult to separate bank debt from government debt when the governments 
have bailed out banks. The government/taxpayer takes over the role of the debtor. There 
is reason to combine the two debtors. Table 4 displays the debts of the banks and 
governments.  
Debtor is listed in row and creditor in column. Thus Spain owed $220 billion to 
the French and $238 billion to the Germans. The major creditors were the French and 
German banks. The major creditors for Ireland were Britain and Germany. Last column is 
total debt to all countries in addition to those in the table. 
When the crises occurred in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain, whether due to 
the government or the private sector, defaults occurred or were threatened. If Spain 
defaulted then assets of the British, French and German banks/government declined in 
value. If the Irish defaulted, the British and German banks/government were affected.  Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  18 
 
 
Table 4. Banks and governments. Debtor, Creditor by country, $billions.  
 
Debtors  
Greece  Ireland  Italy  Spain  Portugal  Britain  France  Germany  Total 
debt  
 
Greece  -  8.5  6.9  1.3  9.7  15  75  45  236 
Ireland  0.8  -  18  16  22  188  60  184  867 
Italy  0.7  46  -  47  5.2  77  511  190  1,400 
Spain  0.4  30  31  -  28  114  220  238  1,100 
Portugal  0.1  5.4  6.7  86    24  45  47  286 
Britain                   
France                   
Germany                   
Total  2  89.9  62.6  150.3  64.9  418  911  704   
Source: Fidelity Investments, Strategic Advisers, 2010. Row is debtor and column is 
creditor. 
Conclusions 
The main causes of the debt crises in Europe varied by country. In Ireland and in 
Spain, they were mainly due to the private sector, particularly housing. These crises had 
great similarity to those in the US: the S&L crisis, the agricultural crisis in the 1980s and 
the mortgage crisis in 2007-08. In Greece and Portugal, the cyclically adjusted structural 
deficit was the major cause. 
In Ireland and Spain, the domestic housing booms were financed from foreign 
borrowing. The creditors failed to require a risk premium related to the probability of 
default. The anticipated return was the sum of the marginal product of capital plus an 
anticipated capital gain or asset price appreciation. The marginal product of capital was 
below the rate of interest. The debt was anticipated to be refinanced from the capital Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe  19 
gains in excess of the interest rate, not from current earnings. The anticipated capital 
gains were based upon recent experience, which was unsustainable. The debts were 
excessive – the actual exceeded the optimal derived from stochastic optimal control. 
When the capital gain fell below the rate of interest, the borrowers in the housing industry 
defaulted. Their creditors were the banks who in turn were debtors to international 
lenders.  
On the basis of the Stochastic Optimal Control analysis, the optimal ratio of 
debt/net worth of the private sector has the following form. It is equal to the trend of the 
capital gain less the trend of the interest rate plus the current return on assets less a risk 
premium, all of that multiplied by risk factors consisting of variances of the capital gains, 
interest rates and the correlation between these stochastic terms. It is not the current or 
recent capital gains and interest rates that are relevant but their trends/drifts over a 
longer period. An early warning signal EWS of a debt crisis is a significant excess debt – 
the actual less the optimal debt ratio.  
A sensible EWS for the excess government debt is the trend of the debt burden – 
interest payments/GDP. Insofar as the government deficits have a marginal product above 
the interest rate, the debt burden will tend to decline. Insofar as the budget deficits have 
marginal productivities below the interest rate, the debt burden will rise. In the cases of 
Greece and Portugal the trend was highly positive, and in Spain and Ireland the trend was 
negative. 
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